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own docks; they had to build hundreds of miles of railroads; and they had to go into the virgin forests and cut down trees in order to make their barracks. They had to mobilize engineers, foresters, railroad men and construction men as well as soldiers—all this tremendous machinery of industry had to be created over there so as not to interrupt the war preparations of France or England; and the stream of men going across the Atlantic today exceeds the expectations of England and France and is a source of amazement to them.

People will tell about our failure to produce guns here in America at once, but they do not say anything about the fact that we selected the best foreign models, and gave contracts for their production in English and French factories so that we could give them money and give them work, and how we went to work in the meantime and produced the best machine gun in the world today—the Browning. They do not say a word about these tremendous accomplishments—how a nation is straining every energy to help in a great way and to the very best of our ability, but they take the aeroplane situation, where certain inefficiencies were shown, and they harp on it in order to throw doubt and confusion upon every other war preparation. Let us go after the failure, let us remedy it, let us have criticism, but let us not tear down the whole structure of achievement when we have to replace a defective brick.

FREEDOM OF DISCUSSION IN WAR TIME

BY NORMAN ANGELL,
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I propose to deal with one phase only of the problem of the mobilization of the public mind. It is this: "What degree of freedom of public discussion will best fit a democracy to wage war effectively?"

It is not merely, or perhaps mainly, a governmental question, but one which confronts newspapers and bodies like universities and churches; one of its most important aspects is that of personal relationships. I shall not enter into the discussion of any proposed legislation, nor touch in any way on the attitude of the government.

Indeed, I have never been able to judge whether the administration is now blamed for being too repressive or too liberal. Reading one group of papers one can only conclude that the administration is perversely encouraging all the alien enemies in the country to carry on a propaganda against it. Reading another group of papers one must conclude that it is set upon ruthlessly stamping out all criticism of itself however honest and patriotic. Into that debate I shall not enter in the least. The question is mainly perhaps, as I have already suggested, an extra-governmental one. It is vastly important and we should judge it in the light of experience.

It is surely the duty of all of us belonging to the Alliance to compare notes of experience in anything that can bear upon our success. And let us hope that we have reached now a stage of unification by virtue of which that exchange can take place freely between different nationals within the Alliance without implication of unseemliness. I want to point out certain European experience in this matter and—in order to disentangle issues and present something resembling a clear thesis—suggest to you that that experience on the whole points to this conclusion: A democracy, and still more a group of democracies forming an Alliance, will wage war most effectively if public discussion is as free as possible. Certain limitations of course I take for granted, as that the dissemination of military information shall be controlled by the military authority, and that no direct incitement to resist the actual prosecution of the war shall be permitted. But there is a natural feeling in war time that control should go much beyond this, and, as a matter of fact, in the early stages of a war always does. Yet I suggest that such a policy, in the case of our democracies, is to the advantage of the enemy.

THE ADVANTAGES OF PUBLIC DISCUSSION

Experience would seem to show that a democracy will get the best results by a degree of toleration which would allow war aims and peace terms, the justice or injustice of the war, when it ought to stop and on what conditions, all to be freely discussed; and would allow the socialist, pacifist and semi-pacifist to do their worst. They might do a certain amount of harm; but less harm, in the long run, than is done in practice by their suppression. On balance, the advantage is on the side of toleration. Save for the limitations already indicated, freedom of press, speech and discussion should,

in the interest of a sane and balanced public opinion even more necessary to democracies in war than in peace, be complete and unhampered.

I am aware it seems ridiculous to urge such a degree of toleration in war time. But I shall base the claim not on any ground of the rights of minorities to certain moral or intellectual privileges. Personally I cannot understand how any claim can be made on that ground when the existence of a nation is at stake; how, in such circumstances, minorities can have any rights, as against the common need, that should be regarded—but precisely on the ground of common need, of advantage to the nation as a whole.

Public opinion in the early stages of war, in every nation, is always in favor of a "truce to discussion." We remind one another then that the time for words has passed and the time for action come. "Talk" is disparaged. We demand the *union sacrée*. And almost always is that rule first broken by those who at the beginning were most insistent upon its enforcement. Take the case of England. A party truce was declared at the outbreak of war and the feeling against public criticism of the government or its policy was intense. Such public men as attempted anything resembling it were indeed driven from public life for a time, mainly by the influence of the group of papers controlled by Lord Northcliffe. What happened finally was that Mr. Asquith's government was driven out and replaced by another largely as the result of the criticisms of Lord Northcliffe's papers.

Now whether you take the view that that result was good or bad you justify public discussion. If the result was good, if the war was being mismanaged, the country was saved by virtue of public discussion—by virtue of abandoning the rule of silence. If you take the view that the result was bad you have a case where a government found it impossible to resist the intervention of public judgment, although it must have known that judgment to be wrong. And if it was wrong, it must have been because the public judged on an insufficient knowledge of the facts and made wrong conclusions concerning them; because in other words, public discussion was not full, had not all the facts, did not hear all sides. Either verdict pushes one to the conclusion that the public will judge either with or without the facts and opportunity for free discussion; and that the part of wisdom is to see that that discussion is as full and well-founded in fact as possible.

We may say: "That establishes the case for the full public discussion of the government's administrative capacity because all parties to the discussion are agreed upon the ultimate aim—the winning of the war. But no purpose is served by the discussion of war aims and peace terms during the war; or by tolerating veiled sedition." But the case for full discussion of aims and policy is even clearer than the case for public discussion of the government's administrative capacity. Let us again take the facts of the discussion of policy in England.

FREE DISCUSSION AND THE ENGLISH PRESS

What, in practice, did the truce to discussion of peace terms or war aims mean in the case of the English press? It meant in practice, not that the discussion ceased, but that all liberal contribution to it did. Again one can illustrate that by the role of what we know as "the Northcliffe Press." And you will note that I am not criticising or condemning the intervention of that press; I am supporting it; but I am asking that the freedom which is accorded to newspapers of that type should be accorded to all others. The Northcliffe Press, far from refraining from discussion of peace terms, began very early to discuss them most energetically. It was mainly due to its agitation, for instance, that the Paris Economic Conference was held to devise the economic conditions which should obtain after the war. That was a most important peace term. It created, right or wrongly, the impression that, whatever happened, Germany's trade would be met in the case of her defeat by very hostile combinations. That may be an entirely wise policy; I am not for the moment concerned to discuss it. But there are two points about it to be noted: the first is that members of the British Cabinet—one or two notably—were notoriously opposed to it; and the second is that the views of these members, and of others who opposed the policy of the Conference, got no expression in the press. The public heard only one side of the case: the case presented by the Northcliffe Press. The public, in imposing that policy upon the government may have been right—though as a matter of simple fact the overwhelming preponderance of opinion is now the other way—but in that case they were right by accident, for they certainly did not hear the case against it. I am merely taking that Conference, which of itself had not perhaps very

great importance, as an illustration of the way in which public judgment is shaped on other matters of policy which are vastly more important and with which I shall deal presently. Why was the Liberal Press silent, or relatively silent, in criticising the policy of the Paris Conference? Because in the temper then prevailing any argument against the proposed economic punishment of the Germans would have been regarded as pro-Germanism and the Liberal Press could not face the implication.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DISCUSSION

One must enter here a little into the elements of war psychology and the psychology of discussion. I will try not to be very abstruse. If you have ever taken part in a discussion of Protection and Free Trade during an election you know that when feeling has begun to run a little high the Protectionist becomes absolutely convinced that the obvious blindness of the Free Trader to the protectionist truth can only be accounted for by the fact that, by some moral perversion, the Free Trader is more concerned with the welfare of foreigners than with that of Americans. I need not remind you that for years every Free Trader in America was an Anglomaniac, if indeed he had not been suborned by the gold of the Cobden Club. Now if in times of profound peace an honest attempt to find the best policy for one's own country can in this way be interpreted as hostility to one's country, merely because the proposed policy is also good for the foreigner, how much more must we expect that kind of misapprehension in the immeasurably fiercer passions of war time. It is natural, human, excusable, a phase of the instinct of pugnacity and self-preservation, an essential element of war psychology, perhaps indispensable to national morale.

But note how it operates in the case of the press. We agree not to discuss peace terms. A paper of large circulation has an article demonstrating that there will never be any peace in the world until the enemy nation is utterly destroyed; that the people are as much to blame as the government. It strikes nobody that this is a discussion of policy or peace terms. A rival paper has an article arguing that no territory must be taken from the enemy and that we have no quarrel with the enemy people. In this case we realize, not only that it is a discussion of terms but a very irritating one, with a pro-German coloring to boot. And we have a general

impression that that sort of thing ought to be suppressed. Now, when to the handicap on the liberal paper is added the prospect of legal penalties, its position becomes hopeless. Incidentally, when we suppress an obscure socialist paper, the importance of the act is not in that suppression, but in the effect that it has upon the policy of much more powerful papers who realize that they will have to look out and do not feel disposed to take any risks at all in such a public temper—which doubtless extends to government officials and to juries. The liberal press becomes silent, and control of opinion passes to those papers that appeal to the impulsive and instinctive, rather than to the reflective, element. This state of mind which I have described is progressively strengthened. And a good job too, you may say. You might quote the movie advertisement to the effect that you cannot put up a good fight until your blood boils; so the more it boils the better.

THE DIRECTION OF POLICY

What, then, is the job of us civilians who are left behind and do not have to go over the top and do the bayoneting? It is, I think we have agreed, the direction of policy. If the government is going wrong we correct it, or replace it, and whether we intervene wisely or not depends upon this state of mind of ours. And I am not sure that boiling blood is the best psychological condition for that judgment; for the public passes upon policies, and makes a choice between them, not by a cold intellectual analysis of their respective merits, but by virtue of a general state of mind and temper.

If we really are directing the fight in its larger aspects—and I think we are agreed on that point—a certain balance and sanity of judgment rather than violent temper may be desirable. I believe it is a ruse of a prize fighter who is getting the worst of it to try and make his opponent really angry. Then the opponent's bad temper may compensate for his superior strength or ability. The torreador manages to reduce an opponent twenty times his own strength by making that opponent literally "see red."

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

Have there been any other definite problems of policy in which has operated the kind of process I have described in connection with

the Paris Conference? I think there have been questions of policy so important that our success or failure may be determined by them. There was, for instance, our relation to the Russian revolution. It is easy, of course, to be wise after the event—and it is wise to be wise after the event, because it may be duplicated in the future. But we are probably pretty well agreed now that that event has been mishandled by the Allies. We in Europe did not sufficiently see it coming, and when it came, large sections of our public and press took a line which could only irritate and alienate the strongest elements in the revolution. It has been said very generally by many who have studied the revolution closely that if the Allies had acceded in time to Kerensky's desire for a re-statement of Allied aims, the German and Bolshevik agitation against him could have been checked and a separate peace prevented. That may not be true; we can never know. But if it had been true, or true in any degree, our public temper was such that it would have stood in the way of taking advantage of the fact; of doing what Kerensky desired.

There is an incident in our relations with Russia, small in itself, but which illustrates clearly the way in which public "violent-mindedness" may be responsible for disastrous errors of policy. When Arthur Henderson was in Petrograd as the representative of the British government, he realised the immense importance of conciliating the left wing of the revolution and undermining the movement for a separate peace. It happened that one particular British Labor leader, Ramsay Macdonald, had an especial influence in Russia. Henderson telegraphed urging that Macdonald be sent. The government agreed; his passport was granted—whereupon a British Trades Union, out of the intensity of its patriotism called a seaman's strike to prevent Macdonald's going. Had the union weighed the pros and cons in terms of sound policy of Macdonald's going to Russia? They did not even pretend to. They just did not like Macdonald whom they regarded as pro-German. For a year or two there had been an intense campaign on the part of certain papers against him on that score. He was a red flag to most patriotic Englishmen. Consequently, when it came to the question as to whether, whatever his personal views, it might not for a special purpose be wise to use him—as the government was prepared to use him—the state of public temper made sober judgment impossible. The action of the most intensely patriotic trades union in

Great Britain was undoubtedly of immense service to the German cause.

For remember this: the greatest disaster so far suffered by the Allied cause, whether that disaster was preventable or not, has been the defection of Russia. In so far as the enemy is succeeding on the military side that success is mainly explained by our failure to maintain the integrity of our Alliance. The enemy's success is in this sense a political success—his advantageous military position is due to our political failures. Yet here was a British trades union out of the very fierceness of its patriotism adding to the difficulties of this overwhelming need of retaining Russia within the Alliance. And that incident is merely illustrative of the fashion in which the general temper of the public for the time being, not any cold intellectual analysis of pros and cons, decides questions of policy which may have vast, catastrophic military results. If an Italian policy—since, it is now understood, abandoned—alienated important elements in our Alliance like the potential coöperation of the Southern Slavs and the Greeks, it was because a small minority of Italians were able to win over Italian patriotic feeling, as distinct from sober thought, to an unwise policy. And in such matters as our future policy to Russia—and Russia's position may determine whether the world is to have a preponderance of power in the future against Prussia—our relations to Japan, and to such problems as Irish Conscription, wise decisions will not be reached by boiling blood or intense emotionalism. It may help to carry us along the road, but it does not help us to determine the right road.

And what is the right road will be sometimes an infinitely difficult decision for this reason: Our cause is maintained by an Alliance made up of many different states separated by diversities of national character. Our success will depend upon whether we can hang together. Divergencies of aim there are bound to be, and if there cannot be a large measure of other-mindedness, of give and take, of sympathy at times with other views larger perhaps than we have shown in the case of Russia, disruption like that involved in the Russian defection will go on.

Why do I stress the Russian incident? Because it is evident that we have not learned its lesson. The forces which produced the Russian revolution—a striving of the mass after entirely new social and economic conditions—are at work in all European

countries. Read the report of the English labor party. They will not work out in the same way of course in England that they did in Russia; but something of the same force is moving. What is the attitude of the American democracy as represented by organised American labor towards that movement? It is pretty much the attitude which British public opinion as a whole took towards the Russian radical groups a year or two ago. American labor seems disposed to take the ground that the British Labor Party is pro-German and defeatist, and it seems disposed to back the political opponents of the British Labor Party. If it did, that would be taking sides in British politics with a vengeance; but what is much more to the point, it would be taking the wrong side. For without any sort of doubt the British Labor Party is the coming greatest single force in British politics. Are we to see the monstrous spectacle of American organised labor in alliance with British and French reaction, with the enemies of British and French labor in their own country? Recent events seem to indicate that that is quite a possibility. If it were realised it would certainly not add to the strength of the alliance of the western democracies.

NECESSITY OF FREE DISCUSSION

Yet if we are to have any assurance that it is to be prevented there must be a very large measure of freedom of discussion of war aims and peace terms, and what French-British socialism stands for and what it does not. One may doubt whether hand-picked governmental delegations from either side of the Atlantic will be any more successful in maintaining the essential solidarity of aim of the democracies than have been similar methods in the case of Russia.

Those who urge resort in our case to the methods of Germany in the matter of the press and speech seem to overlook two vital differences between the enemy's case and ours. The unity of Germany's alliance can be maintained by the sheer preponderance of power of one member in it, imposing a common policy and aim. Our Alliance is not dominated by any one member who can impose unity of aim and purpose. Our unification depends upon the free coöperation of equals. And if we do not learn give and take, and what our respective purposes really are, we cannot attain that unity and our Alliance will go to pieces. That ultimately will give the advantage to the enemy even though the sum of our power may

be greater than his. The second difference is that he has a long training in moral docility and subservience to government where we have not. Where repression really will "repress" with him, it will not with us. A policy which he could apply safely to Ireland, or to socialists or labor or what not, would in the case of certain Allied peoples undoubtedly cause rebellion.

The truth is that we have not yet formed our Alliance in the sense of deciding its common purposes; whether or not the purposes of Britain are those of the labor party, and France and Italy those of the socialists; what is to be the American relation to the conflicting claims of the various parties, as well as to the aims of Russia and Japan and Ireland and India. The decisions and adjustments in these things cannot be made by intense emotionalism, and violent-mindedness. Unless we keep alive the tradition of free discussions and the feeling for toleration of diverse opinion, we shall undoubtedly have that violent-mindedness and passion, and many of these questions will in that case be decided in that temper. If that is the case Russia will not mark the only rupture in the Alliance, and the outlook will be very dark.

The service that the heretic, political or religious, does is not necessarily to give us the right view; he generally perhaps gives us the wrong. What he does by his objections is to compel us to take stock of our own ideas, when otherwise they would remain unexamined, and so to modify them where they are faulty. That service we need in war time.

WHAT ARE THE REAL MOTIVES OF REPRESSION ?

It is worth while to examine our motives in such things as these. The old inquisitor, and the mobs who watched the burning of heretics or massacred them, were quite sure that they were acting for the glory of God, and because they loved truth. But the simpler and perhaps truer explanation is that they did those things because they hated the heretic; that they were moved by what is perhaps one of the fiercest of human instincts and one of the most powerful motives in all history—the instinct to inflict pain upon those guilty of the insufferable presumption of disagreeing with us. We may really be convinced that we shall add to the solidarity of our Alliance, and understand better what to do about Russia, and Japan, and labor, and Ireland, and ship building, and coördination,

and traffic congestion, and Congressional control and a thousand and one similar questions by an embargo on German music or by severe measures against elderly pacifist clergymen. But in times as grave as these it is worth our while perhaps to see which motive we really put first.

THE ATTITUDE OF PUBLIC OPINION TOWARDS CONGRESS

BY HENRY JONES FORD, PH.D.,
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It is a wise saying that criticism is easy but performance is difficult. It is always the case when difficult and important tasks are being carried on that there are opportunities for fault finding and complaint. The important thing is that means should exist by which public opinion can act intelligently on the subject. Now saying everything in favor of the press that the press would say for itself—and you will admit that is a great deal—I think that I can ask you to bear witness that pure and unsullied devotion to the truth was not always conspicuous and ever manifest in the press even before we had the censorship. And is it not the case that the very idea, the essential characteristic of constitutional government, is that we shall not be dependent upon such outside agencies but that the government itself should be so organized that it would include the function of control; that the activities of the constituted organs of authority should be sufficient to define responsibility and to apportion praise or blame where it is justly due? What is representative government except representing the interests of the people and giving to them exact and effective expression?

There is a marked disposition to speak in terms of disparagement of the behavior of Congress in this emergency and I think it is important at the outset to say that you cannot possibly reach a fair judgment on questions of this kind if you approach the matter merely from its personal aspects. The general idea seems to be that members of Congress are not fully up to their duty and responsibility and that their personal defects are the cause of trouble, whereas the true ground of criticism is the character of the system